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Viatical Settlements: The Need For Regulation to
Preserve the Benefits While Protecting the Ill and
the Elderly From Fraud*
I. INTRODUCTION

The doctor looked solemn as he scanned Bob's chart. The chemotherapy is not working as well as everyone had hoped ...

the can-

cer is spreading... nothing else to try. His words came through in
a haze. Six months.. . maybe a year or a little more. You are going to need care... twenty-four hours a day. How can you arrange
that when you cannot work and your savings have already been
spent? The only thing left is that life insurancepolicy, but that is
no help now.., or is it?
Across town, Sue sits in her corner office and reviews the latest
financial reports. Her business is finally doing well ...

the hard

work is paying off at last. Finally, she is able to think about some
other investments, but where?

Stocks are down ...

bonds aren't

doing well either. Besides, wouldn't it be great to invest in something that might help someone else? Maybe pay back a little for her
good fortune.
In a perfect world, Bob and Sue would meet. She would purchase his life insurance policy to provide the money he so desperately needs. He would be able to pay for caregivers and cover general expenses in his remaining months. In return, Sue becomes
the owner and beneficiary of the policy. When Bob dies, Sue gets
a return on her investment when the insurance company pays her
the death benefit. She also gets a sense of satisfaction from helping someone who is so obviously in need.
Of course, this is not a perfect world. This scenario illustrates
the basic workings of a viatical settlement in its pure form. An
individual who is in need of cash sells an asset that carries value
but that is not of immediate use to the individual otherwise. Another person, who has money to invest, buys the asset at a dis* A previous version of this comment won third place in the ABA/FJC Law and Aging
Student Essay Competition, Sid Kess Award, and appeared in the New York City Law
Review. See Anna D. Halechko, Comment, Viatical Settlements and the Elderly: Potential
Advantages and Hidden Dangers, 6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 135 (2003).
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counted rate for the promise of a higher return later. This seemingly simple concept has led to the growth of a billion dollar industry in the buying and selling of viatical contracts.
This comment will explore the basic workings of a viatical settlement, along with its benefits and disadvantages for both the
insured and the investor. The problem of fraud which has permeated the viatical market will be reviewed with the developing case
law related to the viatical industry. Finally, the potential for
regulation of the industry will be addressed.
II. THE MEANING OF A VIATICAL SETTLEMENT
A viatical settlement is a process by which a terminally-ill individual can sell his life insurance policy to an investor who pays the
insured a discounted face value and then collects the policy benefit
upon the insured's death.' The term "viatical" comes from the
Latin word "viaticum" which in Roman times was a purse containing money and provisions for a journey.' More recently, the term
refers to the communion given to the dying in the last rites of the
Catholic church.' In its purest form, a viatical settlement is a way
in which a dying person can acquire access to resources to aid his
last days of life. This noble-sounding purpose, however, has been
complicated and often corrupted by the actions of over-zealous entrepreneurs who are willing to take advantage of the most vulnerable in society in order to increase profit. In recent years, viatical
settlements have been marketed to the chronically ill, as well as
the terminal. As a result, the elderly have become targeted as a
major market for this financial vehicle.4
The key parties in a viatical settlement are the insured, known
as the viator, the insurance company who issued the policy, and
the viatical settlement provider who purchases the policy from the
insured. In some cases, the viatical settlement provider is actually a broker who merely matches the viator with an investor who
will actually purchase the policy. As the investment market in
viaticals has grown, the roles of provider and broker have become
blurred. Many providers purchase policies in order to resell them
to investors or merge them into large investment pools, which are
1. Liza M. Ray, The Viatical Settlement Industry:Betting on People's Lives Is Certainly
No "Exacta," 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 321 (2000).

2. Id. at 325.
3.
4.

Id.
Lawrence A. Frolik, Insurance Fraud on the Elderly, TRIAL, Jun. 2001, at 48.
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then sold in shares.5 These mutual funds of viaticated policies or
"death futures" have become popular investment vehicles but also
the subject of numerous fraudulent schemes.6
The first step in the viatication process is a meeting between the
terminally-ill insured and the viatical provider. The provider will
typically require access to the insured's medical records and will
often contact the insured's physician directly. In addition, the
provider will review the insurance policy to determine that change
of beneficiary is permitted and that no unusual restrictions apply.
He will also ascertain that the insurer is a reputable company
with a strong record of paying beneficiaries promptly. Essentially,
the provider is investigating the factors which will determine the
degree of risk in his investment. From this determination, he will
calculate an offer price for the viator.
If the viator accepts the offer, the policy is sold to the provider
who then lists himself as the beneficiary on the policy. The provider is now responsible for paying any remaining premiums.
Typically, the provider will stay in touch with the viator and upon
the viator's death will collect the entire face value of the policy.
The provider's profit is the face value minus the amount paid to
the viator, minus any premiums or other administrative expenses. 7
In this simplified version, the viator and provider work with one
another directly. In reality, there are likely to be many intervening parties involved in the transaction. As noted, a broker often
makes the initial contact with the viator, who may not even be
aware of the true purchaser of his policy. Often the funds are not
passed directly but are held in escrow until the beneficiary change
is finalized. Afterward, there may be others involved in administering the policy by paying the premiums, checking on the viator,
obtaining a death certificate, and applying to the insurer for the
death benefit.
The complexity of this process is significant and poses some
dangers for the viator, who may not realize initially that he is
dealing with a conglomerate of businesses rather than with an
individual.8 The major power imbalance between the viator and
5. Miriam R. Albert, The Future of Death Futures: Why Viatical Settlements Must be
Classifiedas Securities, 19 PACE L. REV. 345, 349-50 (1999).
6. Id. at 350-51.
7. Id. at 349.
8. Joy D. Kosiewicz, Death for Sale: A Call to Regulate the Viatical Settlement Industry, 48 CASE W. RES. 701 (1998). "On one side of the transaction is a large company with
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the viatical settlement provider and his associates creates a strong
potential for abuse.9 Because of his illness, the viator may not
have the energy or motivation to "comparison shop" for the best
payment." Nor may he realize that he is giving up all rights to
the policy for himself and his former beneficiaries." Time is precious to the viator, so issues may arise if the payment is delayed or
some other problem occurs, and he is unable to contact the viatical
provider. Finally, there are the major issues of confidentiality and
privacy, since each additional party to the viatical transaction
may gain access to the viator's medical records and may even intrude upon the viator's privacy directly by phoning or visiting him
at home, ostensibly to see how he is doing but actually to determine that he is still alive.
III. GROWTH OF THE VIATICAL INDUSTRY
The viatical industry was born in the 1980's in response to the
AIDS crisis. 2 In the early years of the pandemic, AIDS was a rapidly fatal disease whose victims usually died within a few months
of their diagnosis. Many AIDS sufferers were single gay men who
had little need to leave their insurance proceeds to beneficiaries
and great need for an infusion of income to pay for their care after
they became debilitated by the disease. Their life expectancies
were short and relatively predictable, and so they became attractive subjects for viatication.
The industry grew dramatically from the sale of approximately
five million dollars in policy values in 1989 to well over one billion
dollars by 2000.'" Along the way, the essential characteristics of
the viator population changed. Advances in medicine made AIDS
numerous resources, lots of money, and enormous bargaining power. On the other side is a
terminally or chronically ill patient or elderly person with little money, big expenses, and
few resources." Id. at 703.
9. Id. at 704.
10. Miriam R. Albert, Selling Death Short: The Regulatory and Policy Implications of

Viatical Settlements, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1013 (1998). The viatical provider may essentially
have a monopoly in a local area:
Each geographic area has a small number of firms providing a service with no close
substitutes, some barriers to entry, and the potential for excess profits .... Thus vi-

atical settlement companies may have functional monopolies which allow them, in effect, to hold potential viators who may be too sick to travel, or even to investigate
other alternatives, essentially as geographic hostages.
Id. at 1023.
11. Kosiewicz, supra note 8, at 705.
12. Id. at 704.
13. Albert, supra note 5, at 353.

Summer 2004

Viatical Settlements

807

a treatable, if not curable, disease. 4 Instead of dying within a few
months, AIDS patients could be maintained on a regimen of antiviral "cocktails" for years. 5 They no longer were the sure bet for
rapid demise that had been so attractive to the early viatical settlement companies. 6 Nevertheless, the viatical providers found
new markets for their product in the growing population of chronically ill and elderly. 7 People suffering from cancer, Alzheimer's
disease, and other progressive illnesses, as well as the frail elderly
in need of funds for assisted living, found viatical settlements to
provide a new source of income.' 8 In addition, a rather surprising
new viator was the affluent older person who had purchased life
insurance when his children were young, but who no longer felt
the need to provide for them and wanted to enjoy, at least, a partial return from his policy. 9
A major impetus to the growth of the viatical settlement industry occurred with the passage of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (hereinafter "HIPAA") in 1996.20 Under
the IRS regulations in existence prior to HIPAA, payments received under a life insurance contract by reason of the death of the
insured were excluded only from the taxable income of the beneficiary.' In contrast, payment received by the insured for the sale
of his policy was considered ordinary taxable income.22 HIPAA
expanded the exclusion to benefit the terminally ill by providing
that viatical settlements and accelerated death benefits would not
be taxable. 23 The Act also provided a relatively flexible definition
of terminal illness as an illness or physical condition of the indi-

14. Id. at 354-55.
15. Albert, supra note 10, at 1047.
16. Albert, supra note 5, at 355.
17. Id. at 357.
18. Id.
19. Joseph B. Treaster, Death Benefits, Now for the Living, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998,
at C1.
20. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 26 U.S.C.S. § 101
(1997).
21. Andrew Spurrier, The Death of Death Futures?:The Effects of the Health Insurance
Portabilityand Accountability Act of 1996 on the Insurance and Viatical Settlement Industries, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 807, 812 (1998).
22. Id. at 814.
23. Id. Accelerated death benefits, in contrast to viatical settlements, are paid by the
insurance company to the insured under the terms of some policies. Typically these benefits represent a lower percent of the policy face value than a viatical payment, but the remaining value of the policy is paid to the beneficiary after the insured's death. Ownership
of the policy remains with the insured. Id. at 809-10.
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vidual such that death can "reasonably be expected" to occur
24
within 24 months, as estimated by the individual's physician.
In addition, HIPAA extended tax benefits to the chronically ill,
as well as the terminal, if the proceeds of the viatical settlement
were used to pay for long-term care services. 25 A chronically ill
individual was defined as someone who is unable to perform at
least two activities of daily living without assistance for a period of
at least 90 days or who requires substantial supervision to protect
his health and safety because of severe cognitive impairment.2 6
By the late 1990's, viatical marketers focused heavily on these
new target populations of terminally and chronically ill elderly,
and AIDS sufferers comprised only a small percentage of viators.27

IV. FRAUD IN THE VIATICAL INDUSTRY
The elderly are particularly susceptible to becoming victims of
fraudulent investment schemes.28 Diminished acuity in sight and
hearing causes difficulty in reading the fine print of contracts or
listening to an oral explanation of risks and benefits.29 Poor
health and lack of energy may prevent the individual from conducting a thorough investigation before signing an agreement. °
Cognitive deficits such as mild dementia or simple short-term
memory loss may interfere with understanding the transaction.3 1
Even social isolation can contribute to the elderly person's vulnerability when approached by a seemingly friendly salesperson."2
The prospect of selling a policy to a viatical settlement company
may seem like an easy method to acquire extra funds for a chronically ill elderly person living on a fixed income. However, the extra money may do no more than interfere with the person's eligibility for means-tested benefits, such as Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)."3 Nursing homes may even encourage
24. Id. at 816.
25. Spurrier, supra note 21, at 818.
26. Id.
27. See Gary J. Gasper, Viatical Settlements - Cashing Out Life Insurance, 11 PROBATE
& PROPERTY 20 (1997).
28. Lawrence A. Frolik, Why the Elderly Are Vulnerable to Insurance Fraud,Ass'n Trial
Law. Am. Ann. Convention Reference Materials (2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. See also Frolik, supra note 4.
33. Gregory C. Larson and Melissa Hauer, Planningfor Nursing Home Care in North
Dakota, 74 N. DAK. L. REV. 191 (1998).
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elderly residents to become viators because the resulting selfpayment from the resident would be higher than the home's reimbursement from Medicaid.34 At the other end of the economic
spectrum, the affluent elderly person who has funds to invest may
be drawn by promises of high returns and low risk or may even
view the viatical market as a humanitarian endeavor. 5
Unfortunately, the viatical industry has been plagued with
many forms of fraud and unethical practices. Because of the complex relationships among the viator, the insurance company, the
viatical provider, the investor, and various agents and brokers, the
possibilities for deception are numerous.
In general, fraudulent practices in the viatical industry can be
classified into four major types: (1) insurance agents defrauding
insurance companies by hiding the viator's health status; (2) viators defrauding insurance companies on their own; (3) viators defrauding viatical settlement companies; and (4) viatical settlement
companies defrauding viators and investors alike.3 6
An example of the first type of fraud is seen in a recent case,
Davis v. Texas,37 in which an insurance agent worked with a viatical provider to induce viators to apply for additional policies. The
insurance agent and viatical provider conspired in an elaborate
scheme to acquire new policies by hiding the medical conditions of
the applicants, and then selling the policies to unsuspecting investors.38 The viatical provider first solicited viators at resource centers for AIDS patients and even by contacting social workers in
hospitals. 9 Soon after they sold their existing policies to the viatical company, the AIDS sufferers were contacted by the insurance
agent who assisted them in applying for several new policies. °
The agent filled out the insurance applications with false information about the applicant's health status, a process known as "clean
sheeting.' 1 The viators were reimbursed for the policy premiums

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Albert, supranote 5, at 364.
See Treaster, supra note 19.
Albert, supranote 5, at 368.
68 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. App. 2002).
Davis, 68 S.W.3d at 277.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 279.

810

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 42

and were paid directly for each new policy issued. The new policies were then sold by the viatical provider to various investors.43
The second type of fraud, viator fraud on the insurance company, is illustrated in Amex Life Insurance v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County.' An applicant for an insurance policy, who
knew he was HIV positive, sent an imposter to take the physical
exam required for the policy.4 5 Although the impostor was a different height and weight and his signature did not match that on
the application, the policy was issued anyway.46 Later, the insured
individual sold the policy to a viatical company. After the viator's
death and the discovery of the deception, the insurance company
attempted to withhold payment to the viatical provider.47 The
court ruled against the insurer, however, because the two-year
contestability period on the policy had expired. The court noted
that it is the insurance company's responsibility to determine that
information provided by applicants is accurate.48 Even if a policy
is initially obtained through fraud, after the contestability period
ends, the policy can only be cancelled for failure to pay the premiums.49

The third type of fraud potentially could occur if the viator presented his health status as worse than it actually was, thus deceiving the viatical provider into offering a higher payment for his
policy.5 ° Typically, the sooner the viator's death is expected, the
greater the portion of the face value of the policy which is paid out
in the viatical settlement. The risk for the viatical provider is less
in a short term investment because of the likelihood of a faster
return from the death benefit and the reduced need for payout of
premiums and administrative expenses. Therefore, it is financially advantageous for the potential viator to appear to be closer

42. Id.
43. Davis, 68 S.W.3d at 282. The case record includes over 12,000 pages of documentary evidence of multiple interacting companies, including offshore entities in the Bahamas. Id. The appellant Davis also objected unsuccessfully to introduction of testimony
concerning his three convictions for murder of a husband, wife, and infant child for insurance and inheritance benefits. Id. at 283. The court ruled the testimony was "extremely
instructive concerning appellant's character." Id. at 283-84.
44. 930 P.2d 1264 (Cal. 1997).
45. Amex, 930 P.2d at 1266.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1271.
49. Id. at 1273.
50. Albert, supra note 5, at 377.
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to death than he actually may be.5' For example, an AIDS patient
could postpone starting a course of treatment until after the viatical settlement was complete."2 If he then underwent a successful
course of treatment that had the effect of prolonging his life, the
profit margin of the viatical provider would be reduced.53
Another potentially fraudulent activity perpetrated by the viator could occur if an insured person sells his policy to more than
one viatical company, although this type of fraud has become less
likely because viatical providers have increased in sophistication
and have required direct confirmation from the insurance company of any policy changes undertaken by the insured.5 4 Nevertheless, in a similar situation, a viator may attempt to sell a policy
over which he has no legal control. In Gander v. Gander, a father
was required as part of a divorce settlement to maintain a life insurance policy on himself as the insured and name his ex-wife as
beneficiary, with all proceeds of the policy to be held in trust for
the couple's two children.55 He sold the policy to a viatical settlement company. 6 The children sued the viatical provider and were
found by the court to be the legal beneficiaries of the policy.5 7 Although the viatical company argued unsuccessfully that it was a
bona fide purchaser of the policy, the court held that the company
had notice of the conflicting claim.5 8 Although the father was the
owner of the policy, he was required by the divorce decree to maintain the policy for the benefit of the children and was not legally
able to transfer it otherwise.5 9 The court held that the viatical
company should have understood the risk it assumed by purchasing a policy that was subject to these restrictions.0
By far, the most prevalent form of fraud is the fourth type, in
which unscrupulous providers and brokers deceive unsuspecting
viators and investors. The chief method by which a viator is defrauded is by receiving payment that is far below the present
value of his policy. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has issued guidelines for payments based on
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
250 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2001).
Gander, 250 F.3d at 608.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the life expectancy of the insured, but these have not been adopted
in all states.6
Many schemes have been perpetrated by viatical providers to
solicit investors fraudulently, often from the vulnerable elderly
population. In Securites and Exchange Commission v. Tyler, 1 2 the
defendant was accused of enticing more than 480 elderly investors
into purchasing viatical shares with false guarantees of liquidity,
high interest rates, and fixed maturity dates. In reality, viaticals
are generally not liquid, do not have fixed maturity dates (since
the date of the insured's death is uncertain), and their rate of return is a variable dependent upon how long the insured survives
after his policy is sold.63 Tyler lured investors through an elaborate campaign of newspaper ads, investment seminars, telemarketing calls, and mass mailings.' Problems arose when the investments reached their promised maturity dates, and the viators
were still alive.65 Tyler attempted to create a liquid market by
purchasing large numbers of viatical contracts in his own name
and then selling shares to investors.66 If an investor wanted to sell
his share, Tyler would buy it back or transfer it to another investor.67 This artificial liquidity failed to hold up when Tyler did not
have sufficient resources to meet the demands of the investors,
and he had to file for bankruptcy.6 8
In a Pennsylvania case, Srein v. Frankford Trust Company," a
broker actually sold the same viatical policies to two investors."
Although both investors had accounts with Frankford Trust, and
the same trust officer administered both accounts, the viaticals
were not registered investments so no one at the trust company
noticed the duplication.7' The viatical agreements were assigned
random numbers and locked in the bank's vault, but were not ana-

61. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION § 5 (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1994)
(amended 1999).
62. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2952, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2002).
63. Tyler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2952, at *3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *4.
66. Id. at *6.
67. Id.
68. Tyler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2952, at *7.
69. 323 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 2003).
70. Srein, 323 F.3d at 219. Srein initially sued the broker and won a judgment of two
million dollars, but by then the broker was insolvent and the judgment could not be collected. Id.
71. Id. at 219.
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lyzed or cross-referenced in any way.7 2 After several years, the
plaintiff began to investigate why his viatical investments were
not paying off and discovered that the policy benefits had been
paid out to the other investor. 3 At the district court level, his suit
against the trust company was unsuccessful because of his contributory negligence in failing to monitor his investments more
closely. 4
On appeal, the decision in favor of the trust company was reversed and remanded for a new trial.75 The Court of Appeals recognized that the trust company had a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, which was established when Frankford solicited his business
and charged him fees for trust management." In failing to establish an efficient tracking system which would have identified the
duplications, Frankford neglected to notice that the proceeds of
Srein's investments were being paid into another account." However, even the Court of Appeals criticized Srein for failing to monitor his investments more closely and only reversed the lower court
because it had failed to properly instruct the jury on the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act." "Let the buyer beware" continues to be the appropriate motto for the investor in viatical
plans.
V. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS AND SECURITIES REGULATION

Courts have struggled with the question of whether viatical arrangements should be considered "securities" and thus subject to
the control of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). If
viaticals are found to be securities, the purveyors of these arrangements would be required to reveal certain information regarding risks and performance of the investments, so that potential buyers would have the capability of making informed decisions. Although it has been monitoring the viatical industry
closely, thus far the SEC has not been successful in obtaining a
clear ruling at the federal level that viaticals must meet the legal
requirements of securities.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
Srein, 323 F.3d at 219.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
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The highest federal court to consider the question has been the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Life Partners,Inc.7" Life Partners marketed fractions of viatical contracts which allowed small
investors to pay as little as a few hundred dollars for a share in a
policy.8" Working through financial planners as its agents, Life
Partners grew to dominate the viatical market, and therefore, it
attracted the attention of the SEC. 8 Although Life Partners modified its business practices several times, essentially the company
operated by identifying potential viators, evaluating their medical
records to determine degree of risk, purchasing the insurance policies and naming the company as beneficiary, and then reselling
fractions or shares of the policies to investors.82 When it came under scrutiny by the SEC, Life Partners changed its practice to either list the investors or an escrow agent as the policy owner, instead of itself.8 3 Under either plan, Life Partners made its profit
through fees charged to the investors before the proceeds of the
policies were paid out.'
The district court which first heard the case agreed with the
SEC and ruled that Life Partners was selling securities without a
license." However, the Court of Appeals reversed that decision
after applying the three-pronged test used by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.86
Under this test, an investment contract is deemed to be a security
if the investors (1) expect profits from (2) a common enterprise
that (3) depends on the efforts of others. 7 Clearly, the investors in
the Life Partners viaticals expected profits, and clearly, theirs was
a common enterprise in that their funds were pooled to buy the
policies and they shared any profits or losses after the policy benefits were paid out.88 However, the court ruled that the third prong
of the test was not met, because Life Partners performed no essential entrepreneurial services after the purchase of the contracts.8 9
79. 87 F.3d 536 (U.S. App. D.C. 1996).
80. Life Partners,87 F.3d at 539.
81. Id.
82. Id. The medical risk evaluations of policy holders were conducted by a physician
who was a part owner of Life Partners. Id. at 539.
83. Id. at 540.
84. Id. at 540.
85. Life Partners,87 F.3d at 538.
86. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
87. Life Partners,87 F.3d at 540 (citing SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99).
88. Id. at 544.
89. Id. at 546.
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The court reasoned that the profitability of the investment was
directly determined by how long a viator lived, not by any actions
of Life Partners itself.90 The court specifically discounted the prepurchase activities performed by Life Partners, such as identification of potential viators, rating of medical risk, and negotiation of
contract price, as not meeting the requirement of the third prong.9 '
Thus, the court established a bright-line test: an investment contract would only be considered a security if, post-purchase, the
seller continued to perform some substantial activity that affected
the profitability of the arrangement. 9'
The Life Partnersdecision has been widely cited and frequently
criticized. Several state appellate courts have considered similar
viatical investment plans and ruled that they are securities for the
purpose of state securities regulation. In Joseph v. Viatica Management, LLC, the Court of Appeals of Colorado ruled that the
"units" of investment in a viatical fund met the state definition of
a security. 93 Viatica Management sold investment units for a
minimum price of $25,000. 9' The plan was to pool these monies
into multi-million dollar funds which would then purchase large
numbers of viaticated policies.95 When the return on investment
proved to be smaller than promised, a disgruntled investor complained to the state securities commission.96 The court applied the
Howey test and found that all three prongs were met.97 In its
analysis of the critical third prong, the Colorado court distinguished this case from Life Partners,although it also noted that it
was not persuaded by the reasoning followed in that case. 98 Essentially the investors in Life Partnerswere sold fractional shares
in specific viatical policies. 99 In contrast, Viatica Management sold
shares in a fund which then purchased multiple policies.' 0° The
identification of these policies and the negotiation of the viatical
settlements were all done post-investment, or at least were not
90. Id. at 545.
91. Id. at 546.
92. Life Partners,87 F.3d at 548.
93. 55 P.3d 264 (Colo. App. 2002).
94. Joseph, 55 P.3d at 265.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 264. When advances in medical treatment led to longer survival times for
AIDS patients, the returns on their viatical settlements did not come as quickly as expected. Id. at 266.
97. Id. at 267.
98. Id.
99. Joseph, 55 P.3d at 267.
100. Id.
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Several state courts have questioned the reasoning underlying
the Life Partners decision. In Siporin v. Carrington, an Arizona
case, the "bright-line" distinction between pre- and post-purchase
activities was challenged.9' Carrington had solicited investors
with brochures promising double-digit returns; he also marketed
to potential viators through local health service organizations. 4
Carrington did his homework in investigating a number of factors
0
which could affect the outcome of the viatical arrangement."
After being given access to medical records, he would contact the
viator's physician for an estimate of life expectancy.'
He also investigated the rating of the life insurance company and determined that the policy allowed assignment of beneficiaries. 7 Finally, he required that former beneficiaries formally waive their
rights under the policy.' 8
The court concluded that the profitability of the viatical investment was directly related to Carrington's pre-purchase activities. ' 9 The success or failure of the investment was largely determined by his skill in selecting appropriate viators who had policies
with strong insurers and whose policies contained the particular
clauses that permitted viatication. 11 In applying the Howey test
and concluding that all three prongs were met, the Siporin court
noted that it was taking a position contrary to that of the Life
Partnerscourt."' Although state courts typically follow the interpretations of federal courts, here the court felt that the rigidity of
the Life Partners bright-line test undermined the purpose of the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 23 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
104. Siporin, 23 P.3d at 93. "In the 'Win/Win Investing' brochure, Carrington suggests
returns of from 10% to 11% for policies in which the viator had a projected life expectancy
of up to 12 months, to as high as 68% to 70% for policies in which the viator's projected life
expectancy was up to 48 months." Id. at 94.
105. Id. at 93.
106. Id. at 93-94.
107. Id. at 94.
108. Siporin,23 P.3d at 94.
109. Id. at 96.
110. Id. at 96-97.
111. Id. at 99.
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securities regulation statutes."2 In concluding that Carrington's
plan constituted the sale of securities, the court stated:
What truly determines viatical settlement profitability is the
realization . . of an outcome predicted by the seller through
its analysis of the viator's life expectancy, the soundness of
the insurer, the actions needed to keep the policy in effect for
the original face amount, and the insurer's unconditional liability under the policy's terms."'
Whether the activities occur before or after the investment is immaterial to the determination
that the investment is a form of se4
curity transaction.1
The Siporin decision was followed in a recent Indiana case, Poyser v. Flora."5 An investor, Flora, charged that the insurance
agent, Poyser, violated the Indiana Securities Act because he was
not registered as a seller of securities and the viatical contracts
themselves were not registered.116 The court noted that viatical
settlement contracts were not mentioned in the Act itself at the
time of Flora's investment, but could be found to qualify as securities under the general category of "investment contracts"." 7 Furthermore, this court challenged the rigidity of the Life Partners
interpretation of the Howey test: the Life Partners majority felt
that Howey required "that profits be made solely from the efforts
of others," while many courts have taken the position that the
"profits only have to be generated predominantly from the efforts
of others." 8 Like the Siporin court, the Poyser court held that the
mortality of the viator was but one of several factors which determine the profitability of the viatical arrangement. 9 Equally important are actions performed by the seller in identifying and
maintaining relationships with viators and insurers. 2 ° Whether
these activities occur pre- or post-investment is immaterial in de-

112. Id.
113. Siporin, 23 P.3d at 99.
114. Id.
115. 780 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind.App. 2003).
116. Poyser, 780 N.E.2d at 1192.
117. Id. at 1194. Flora's investment was made in 1997. In March 2000, the Indiana
legislature amended the Act to include a "viatical settlement contract [or] any fractional or
pooled interest in a viatical settlement contract." Id. at 1197 n.5.
118. Id. at 1195 n.2.
119. Id. at 1197.
120. Id. at 1197.
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termining
whether the third prong of the Howey test has been
121
met.
The rigidity of the Life Partnersapproach has also been rejected
by other federal courts. In Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Tyler, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
reasoned that the defendant performed a post-purchase service
when he bought viaticals in his own name and sold fractions to
investors.'
In this way, he created a form of liquidity which
heightened the value of the investment. 2 1 If investors wanted to
sell their shares, Tyler would either sell them to others or buy
them back himself, thus creating an artificial secondary market. 24
Even though the investors may not have been aware of his actions,
the court felt they relied on his description of the investments as
being liquid. 25 This was felt to be sufficient to pass the third
prong of the Howey test and support the court's finding that the
viatical investment met the definition of a security.'26
In addition, the Tyler court offered an alternative formulation
under which viatical arrangements would qualify for regulation as
securities because they meet the definition of an investment
"note."127 As outlined in the Supreme Court's decision in Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 2 ' securities have the following characteristics: (1)
the seller's purpose is to raise money and the buyer's purpose is to
profit from the investment; (2) the instrument is commonly traded
for speculation or investment purposes; (3) public expectation
holds the instrument to be a security; and (4) no other regulatory
mechanism serves to reduce the risk of the instrument. 91 The Tyler court concluded that these four requirements were met because
the viatical arrangements were clearly bought and sold for profit,
were widely advertised, and sold in multiple states as investments. 3 ' Furthermore, promises made to potential buyers created
the expectation that they were dealing in securities that offered a
fixed interest rate and pre-determined maturity date and value. 3'
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Poyser, 780 N.E.2d at 1198 n.8.
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2952, at *15-16 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2002).
Tyler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2970, at *16-17.
Id.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *9.
494 U.S. 56 (1990).
Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67.
Tyler, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2965, at *12-13.
Id. at *13.
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Finally, it was obvious to the court that no other form of regulation was available to protect investors in these arrangements.
In spite of this group of decisions contrary to Life Partners,state
courts continue to adopt inconsistent positions on whether viatical
settlements should be treated as securities. In a recent Ohio decision, Glick v. Sokol, the court reverted to the position that "the
only variable that can impact the profitability of the viatical settlements at issue is the timing of the death of the insured." 3 Although this court did not cite the Life Partnersdecision, their reasoning was essentially the same: the value of the investment is
determined by the timing of death, not by any actions taken by the
'
viatical settlement provider or broker. 34
While courts remain divided on the issue of viaticals as securities, some states have taken legislative or regulatory action to resolve the problem. For example, the Pennsylvania Securities
Commission (PSC) has issued a notice that viatical settlements
are "investment contracts" and as such are considered to be securities and are subject to the regulations of the PSC. 13 Although it
noted the Life Partners decision to the contrary, the PSC pointed
out that a federal case is not binding on state courts. 136 Under
PSC regulations, sellers of viatical arrangements are required to
be registered in the state as brokers
and must disclose all infor37
mation material to the transaction.'
VI. MODEL ACT AND REGULATION
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
has developed the Viatical Settlements Model Act' 8 and Viatical
Settlements Model Regulation 3 9 to guide states in their supervision of the viatical industry. Originally issued in 1993 and 1994
respectively, both models have been extensively amended to re132. Id.
133. 777 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
134. Glick, 777 N.E.2d at 319. The court reached its decision in spite of its recognition
that, by statute, Ohio declared all viatical arrangements to be securities subject to registration under the Ohio Securities Law, effective October 5, 2001. The Glick investment was
made in 1998. Id.
135. Compliance Notice to the Viatical Industry, 30 Pa. Bull. 6670 (Pa. Sec. Comm'n.
Dec. 23, 2000).
136. Id.
137.
138.

Id.
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1993) (amended

2000).
139.

VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1994)

(amended 1999).
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flect the changing characteristics of the industry. Although similar in many ways to other forms of legislation designed to protect
the investor, the Model Act is unique in its emphasis on protection
for the viator as well.
The Model Act provides that a viatical settlement provider or
broker must be licensed in the state in which the viator resides
and gives the state authority to approve the formats of viatical
contracts.14 The content of disclosure statements to the viator is
specified in detail and includes warnings that the proceeds of the
settlement may be subject to creditor claims and may adversely
affect the viator's eligibility for Medicaid and other government
benefits.' 4' In addition, the viator must be informed about alternatives to viatical settlements, such as accelerated death benefits
and the ability to use the policy as collateral for a loan. 142 Disclosure of these alternate mechanisms is mandated because they
may provide the financial assistance the viator is seeking, while
allowing him to maintain ownership of his policy and potentially
provide a payment to his heirs after his death.
Privacy provisions within the Act assure the viator that his
medical, financial or personal information, including his name,
will only be disclosed with his consent and only to the degree required to achieve the viatical arrangement.1 4 1 In addition, the Act
protects viators from excess intrusiveness by providers, by
limiting visits with the insured to once a month if the insured has
a life expectancy of less than one year and once in three months if
life expectancy is greater than a year.144
Perhaps most important to the viator is the requirement that
the settlement funds be paid to him within three business days of
the date that the insurance company transfers ownership of the
policy. 14 ' The viator is given a 15-day period within which he may
rescind the settlement contract after receipt of the payment. 146 If
the viator dies within this period, the contract is deemed to be rescinded, the viatical payment must be refunded,147and the policy
payment must be made to the original beneficiary.
§§

3-5.

140.

VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

145.

VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 9.E.

146.
147.

Id. at § 9.C.
Id.

at
at
at
at

§ 8.
§ 8.A(1).
§ 6.
§ 9.G.
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In addition to these protections for the viator, the Act specifies
an extensive list of required disclosures to the potential purchaser
of viaticals as investments.4 4 These disclosures must be part of
the purchase contract or a separate document signed by both the
purchaser and provider. "9 Specifically, the purchaser must be informed that there will be no return on his investment until the
insured person dies and that a guaranteed rate of return cannot
be determined since both the length of the investment and the return rate are directly dependent upon the date of the insured's
death. 5 ' Also, it must be clearly stated that the viatical investment should not be considered a liquid purchase because no established secondary market exists for resale of these contracts.'
The investor must also be given information about the type of
insurance policy he is purchasing and whether he is responsible
for paying the premiums or other costs which would reduce the
value of his investment.
The contract must clearly state
whether the investor will be the owner of the policy in addition to
being named as the beneficiary and, if not, how his rights and responsibilities could be affected.'53 Any unusual circumstances,
such as a policy still within its contestability period, must be described with a specific warning that the investment may be lost if
the policy is cancelled."
The qualifications of the physician who determined the viator's
life expectancy and the actuary who projected the sale price must
be revealed.'
The investor must be told how often the insured's
condition will be monitored and by whom, "how the date of death
[will be] determined, and how and when" the investor will receive
this information.'5 6 Like the viator, the investor is given an opportunity to change his mind after entering the agreement, but he
must cancel the contract within three days after receiving these
disclosures. '
The Act also includes an extensive section of guidelines for advertisements of viatical settlements and viatical investment
M

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at § 8.D.
Id.
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §§ 8.D(1)-(2).
Id. at § 8.D(3).
Id. at § 8.D(5).
Id. at § 8.D(12).
Id. at §§ 8.E(5)-(7).
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 8.D(13).
Id. at § 8.E(8).
Id. at § 8.F.
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plans.'58 Certain terms are assumed to be false or misleading on
their face and are prohibited, such as "guaranteed," "no risk,"
"high yield," or "quick profit."'5 9 The viatical settlement provider
or broker is also required to develop an "antifraud plan" which
must be submitted to the state insurance commissioner. 60 The
plan must provide for the detection and elimination of fraudulent
activities by any personnel involved in the viatical settlement
Persons convicted of fraudulent activity under the
process."'
terms of the Act would be subject to imprisonment for up to
twenty years, fines up to $100,000, and mandated to pay restitution to any injured parties. 162
The NAIC Model Regulation includes sample disclosure statements and consumer warnings.' 3 It also provides standards for
determination of reasonable viatical payments." These standards
are based on the life expectancy of the insured and range from
50% of policy face value when the insured's life expectancy is
greater than twenty-four months to 80% when life expectancy is
Among its other protections, the Model
less than six months.'
Regulation provides the interesting stipulation that "[a] viatical
settlement provider shall not knowingly solicit investors who have
insured whose coverage would be the
treated ... the illness of the
66
subject of the investment."
Thirty-seven states have adopted some version of the NAIC
models. On July 4, 2002, Pennsylvania passed its Viatical Settlements Act, which became effective in January of 2003.167 Although
largely drawn from the NAIC Model Act, the Pennsylvania statute
omitted a large section of the Model Act which provided guidelines
for advertising of viatical settlements and investments. The legislators may have felt that the issue would be adequately covered by
the state securities commission in its oversight of viatical investment plans. However, misleading advertising has been at the cen158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at § 11.
Id. at § 1l.D.
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 12.G.
Id.

162. Id. at § 13.
163. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION app. A (1999).
164.

VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION § 5.

165. Id.
166. Id. at § 7.F. Apparently, the drafters of the Model Act were concerned that a physician-investor might be tempted to hasten the demise of the insured in order to receive an
earlier return on his investment.
167. Viatical Settlements Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 626.1-17 (2002).
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ter of much of the fraudulent activity in the viatical industry, so
clear legislative direction in this area would have been advisable.
VII. CONCLUSION
The high incidence of fraud in the viatical industry lends strong
support to the view that these arrangements should be considered
securities and should be regulated as such. However, until a case
involving viaticals rises to the level of review by the United States
Supreme Court, the Life Partnersdecision will remain the highest
federal court holding on the issue. Many state courts and several
federal courts have been reluctant to follow Life Partnersand have
searched for ways to distinguish the facts of their cases in order to
arrive at the conclusion that viaticals are securities. Similarly, a
majority of states have taken legislative action either to declare
viatical arrangements subject to existing securities laws or to
adopt specific new statutes drawn on the NAIC model. Unfortunately, neither court decisions nor legislative actions have been
consistent, and so the opportunity for fraudulent activity continues.
When considering involvement in a viatical settlement, both the
potential viator and the investor must make a cautious appraisal
of the benefits and risks. For the viator, the cash received from a
previously hidden asset may help pay for medication, assisted living, or that last long vacation. But the viator must be careful that
he is receiving reasonable value for his policy and that the viatical
"deal" is better than alternatives of tapping an accelerated death
benefit or simply borrowing against the policy. Individual circumstances must be considered, such as the desire to provide for beneficiaries, as well as the potential impact on Medicaid eligibility.
For the potential investor, the key word is caution. Viatical
plans are not low risk and a positive rate of return is not guaranteed. What looks like a simple way to make money, and maybe
even help a fellow human being in need, is really a complex financial transaction designed to enrich many parties before the individual investor gets his return. Before choosing any viatical investment, the investor should carefully investigate all aspects of
the offer, including the method of selecting viators, the stability of
the insurance companies backing the policies, and the reputation
of the viatical settlement provider or broker. In particular, the
investor must realize that the timing of the viatical payout can
never be guaranteed. As medical science advances, formerly terminal illnesses become chronic conditions which may persist for
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years. During this time, the investor will receive no return and
may even be forced to pay policy premiums and other expenses.
Only those wealthy enough to afford speculating with their funds
should even consider viatical investments.
In spite of these limitations, the viatical industry continues to
grow and is apparently fulfilling needs among the terminally and
chronically ill. In addition, investors appear to be willing to take
on these high-risk vehicles. The need is clear for improved scrutiny of the industry for the protection of both viators and investors. All states should adopt legislation which includes the key
features of the Model Code, particularly the requirement for a
predetermined level of payment to the viator, mandated licensure
of brokers, and strict limits on misleading advertising. In short,
viatical arrangements should be recognized and treated as securities. In this way, heightened surveillance from state regulatory
agencies will reduce the more flagrant abuses which have plagued
the industry and allow the ill and the elderly to benefit from the
positive features of these arrangements.
Anna D. Halechko

